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We demonstrate the first implementation of polarization encoding measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel
attacks. Active phase randomization of each individual pulse is implemented to protect against
attacks on imperfect sources. By optimizing the parameters in the decoy state protocol, we show
that it is feasible to implement polarization encoding MDI-QKD over large optical fiber distances.
A 1600-bit secure key is generated between two parties separated by 10 km of telecom fibers. Our
work suggests the possibility of building a MDI-QKD network, in which complicated and expensive
detection system is placed in a central node and users connected to it can perform confidential
communication by preparing polarization qubits with compact and low-cost equipment. Since MDI-
QKD is highly compatible with the quantum network, our work brings the realization of quantum
internet one step closer.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
normally referred to as Alice and Bob, to generate a
private key even with the presence of an eavesdropper,
Eve [1, 2]. With perfect single photon sources and sin-
gle photon detectors, the security of QKD is guaranteed
by quantum mechanics [3]. However, the aforementioned
perfect devices are not available today and the security
of QKD cannot be guaranteed in real life implementa-
tion. For example, attenuated coherent laser pulses are
commonly used in practical QKD setups, which makes
the QKD system vulnerable to the photon number split-
ting (PNS) attack [4]. Fortunately, it has been shown
that the unconditional security of QKD can still be as-
sured with phase randomized weak coherent pulses [5].
Furthermore, by applying decoy state techniques [6], se-
cure key rate can be dramatically increased in practical
implementations [7]. Nonetheless, other imperfections in
practical QKD systems still present loopholes that can
be exploited by Eve to steal the secret key [8, 9]. We
remark that most of the identified security loopholes are
due to imperfections in the detection systems [8].
Much effort has been put to build loophole-free QKD
systems with practical devices. On one hand, people have
been trying to build a better model to understand all the
imperfections in a QKD detection system [10], but it is al-
most impossible to guarantee that all the loopholes have
been fixed. On the other hand, full device-independent
QKD (DI-QKD) has been proposed to close all the loop-
holes due to devices’ imperfections [11]. The security of
DI-QKD relies on the violation of Bell’s inequality and
does not require any knowledge of how practical QKD
devices work. However, the demand for single photon de-
tectors with near unity detection efficiency and the low
key rate make this protocol highly impractical [12].
Fortunately, measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD), which removes all loopholes in detec-
tors [13], has been proposed as an alternative solu-
tion. Although in MDI-QKD, the assumption of almost-
perfect state preparation cannot be removed, finite basis-
dependent flaw can be tolerated and taken care of [14]
using the quantum coin idea [5].
A typical (polarization encoding) MDI-QKD is illus-
trated in FIG. 1. Alice and Bob independently prepare
weak coherent pulses (with decoy states) in one of the
four BB84 polarization states [1], and send them to an
untrusted third party (UTP) Charlie, who can be an
eavesdropper (Eve). Charlie/Eve is supposed to per-
form Bell state measurements (BSMs) on the incoming
pulses and to publicly broadcast the BSM results to Al-
ice and Bob. A partial BSM can be realized with lin-
ear optics and two of the four Bell states can be regis-
tered: a coincidence between detectors D1H and D1V ,
FIG. 1. (Color online). A typical MDI-QKD setup. Alice and
Bob send out polarization encoded weak coherent pulses (with
decoy states) to Charlie/Eve, who is supposed to perform
partial Bell state measurements with a beam splitter (BS),
polarizing beam splitters (PBS), and single photon detectors.
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2or D2H and D2V , indicates a successful projection into
the triplet state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 + |V H〉), while a
coincidence between detectors D1H and D2V , or D1V
and D2H , indicates a successful projection into the sin-
glet state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉), where H and V
represent the horizontal and vertical polarization states,
respectively. Alice and Bob then reveal their choices of
bases over an authenticated channel and discard coinci-
dence events where they use different bases to generate
a sifted key. A secret key can be generated after error
correction and privacy amplification. In the asymptotic
limit of an infinitely long key, the key rate R is given by
[13]
R ≥ q{p11Y Z11[1−H(eX11)]−QZµµf(EZµµ)H(EZµµ)}, (1)
where q is the proportion of pulses where both Alice and
Bob send out signal states in the rectilinear (Z) basis, µ
is the average photon number of the signal state, p11 =
µ2e−2µ is the conditional probability that both Alice and
Bob send out single photon states given that both of them
send pulses in the signal state, Y Z11 is the yield of single
photon states in the rectilinear basis, eX11 is the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of single photon states in the di-
agonal (X) basis, QZµµ and E
Z
µµ are the gain and QBER
of the signal state in the rectilinear basis,respectively,
f(EZµµ) > 1 is the inefficiency function of error correc-
tion, and H(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) is the
binary Shannon entropy. Here QZµµ and E
Z
µµ can be di-
rectly measured from the experiment, and a lower bound
of Y Z11 and an upper bound of e
X
11 are to be estimated
using the decoy state technique.
The idea of MDI-QKD is indeed built on the time-
reversed EPR-based QKD protocol [15]. Intuitively, the
security of MDI-QKD relies on the fact that Charlie/Eve
is post-selecting entanglement between Alice and Bob,
who can verify such post-selected entanglement via au-
thenticated public discussion of their polarization data.
Since the detection system can be placed in an un-
trusted third party in MDI-QKD, the need for certifying
detectors, which has been a major effort in the standard-
ization of QKD [16], is completely removed. This also
means that Alice and Bob can freely outsource the man-
ufacturing process to untrusted manufacturers. Further-
more, MDI-QKD can be implemented in a network set-
ting: Charlie/Eve, who possesses expensive single photon
detectors, serves as a service centre, and multiple users
can connect to this centre and share the detection system
using time or wavelength multiplexing techniques, thus
leading to a significant cost reduction in building a MDI-
QKD network. In addition, the transmission distance
of MDI-QKD can be further extended via EPR pairs [17]
and other quantum relay and quantum repeater solutions
[18], thus highlighting its compatibility with the future
quantum internet [19].
Various experimental attempts of MDI-QKD with
time-bin encoding [20, 21] and polarization encoding [22]
have been reported . We remark that in [20, 22], only
Bell state measurements with different BB84 states and
intensities were conducted, and in fact no real MDI-QKD,
which requires that both Alice and Bob randomly and in-
dependently modulate their qubits’ states and intensity
levels, was performed. Additionally, phase randomiza-
tion of weak coherent pulses [23], a crucial assumption
in security proofs of decoy state QKD [6], was neglected
in their implementation, leaving the system vulnerable
to attacks on the imperfect weak coherent sources. In
fact, an unambiguous-state-discrimination (USD) attack
on a decoy state QKD system without phase randomiza-
tion has been reported recently [24]. A time-bin phase
encoding MDI-QKD was performed in [21]. To defend
against the USD attack, they turned the lasers on and
off for each pulse and assumed that the phase of each
individual pulse is randomized. However, intensity lev-
els and probability distribution of the signal and decoy
states were not optimized.
In this paper, we report the first experimental demon-
stration of polarization encoding MDI-QKD over 10 km
of optical fibers. While phase and time-bin encoding
MDI-QKD has the advantage of easier polarization man-
agement in optical fiber, it requires expensive and bulky
equipment for phase stabilization in interferometers at
the users’ (Alice and Bob) sites. On the other hand, po-
larization qubits can be easily prepared by the users using
standard optoelectronic devices, which can be miniatur-
ized using state-of-the-art micro-fabrication processes at
a low cost [25]. Those more expensive polarization stabi-
lization systems, if required, can be placed with other ex-
pensive equipments (e.g., detectors) at the service centre.
This makes polarization encoding more favourable in a
network setting. Moreover, there is an increasing interest
in implementing QKD in free space, particularly ground-
to-satellite QKD [26], in which polarization is a preferred
encoding scheme. Our work thus paves the way for fu-
ture implementation of ground-to-satellite MDI-QKD, in
which measurement devices can be placed in an untrusted
satellite.
We implement MDI-QKD with two decoy states [27]
over 10 km of telecommunication fibers. We perform a
numerical simulation to optimize the performance [28]:
average photon numbers are chosen to be µ = 0.3 for
the signal state, ν = 0.1 and ω = 0.01 for the two decoy
states [29]; the ratio of numbers of pulses sent out with
intensities µ, ν, and ω is set to be 4 : 9 : 7. Active phase
randomization is implemented to defend against attacks
on the imperfect weak coherent sources.
Figure 2(a) shows the schematic of our polarization en-
coding MDI-QKD experiment. Each of Alice and Bob
possesses a CW frequency-locked laser (Clarity-NLL-
1542-HP, wavelength ∼ 1542 nm). The laser light is
attenuated and modulated by a LiNbO3 based inten-
sity modulator (IM) to generate weak coherent pulses
at a repetition rate of 500 KHz. Phases of pulses are
3(a) (b)
FIG. 2. (Color online). (a) Experimental setup of polarization encoding MDI-QKD: Attn, optical attenuator; IM, intensity
modulator, PM, phase modulator; AOM, acousto-optic modulator; Pol-M, polarization modulator; PC, polarization controller;
PG, electrical pulse generator; RNG, random number generator; DG, delay generator; BS, beam splitter; PBS, polarizing beam
splitter; SPD, single photon detector; TIA, time interval analyser. (b) Schematic of the polarization modulator: CIRC, optical
circulator; PM-pol, phase modulator; FM, Faraday mirror; PC, polarization controller.
uniformly randomized in the range of [0, 2pi] by a phase
modulator (PM). To implement the decoy state protocol,
intensities of the pulses are randomly modulated by an
acousto-optic modulator (AOM) between the signal and
decoy states.
Key bits are encoded into polarization states of the
weak coherent pulses by a polarization modulator (Pol-
M), whose design is proposed in [30]. The schematic of
the polarization modulator, consisting of an optical cir-
culator, a phase modulator (labelled as PM-pol), and a
Faraday mirror, is shown in FIG. 2(b). Optical pulses are
launched via the optical circulator into the phase mod-
ulator with polarization at 45◦ from the optical axis of
the phase modulator’s waveguide. By modulating the
relative phase between the two principal modes of the
waveguide, four BB84 polarization states can be gen-
erated. Polarization mode dispersion and temperature-
induced variation of polarization states inside the Pol-M
setup can be compensated when pulses are reflected by a
Faraday mirror with a 90◦ rotation in polarization, thus
stable polarization modulation can be achieved.
Alice and Bob need to ensure that they have a shared
reference frame of polarization. Their rectilinear bases
(H and V ) are first aligned manually using fiber polar-
ization controllers (PCs). Alice’s H polarization state
is also aligned to either the fast or slow axis of one of
the fiber squeezers (driven by piezoelectric actuators) in
an electrical polarization controller (General Photonics
PolaRITE III, in Alice’s setup). A DC voltage is then
applied on this squeezer to change the phase retardation
between the components with polarizations along the fast
and slow axes. This corresponds to a unitary transforma-
tion in which Alice’s polarization states in the rectilin-
ear basis remain unchanged, while polarization states in
TABLE I. Experimental values of gains QWIAIB (×10−4) with
intensities IA and IB in basis W ∈ {X,Z}.
rectilinear (Z) basis diagonal (X) basis
HHHHIB
IA µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 0.466 0.1597 0.0225 0.903 0.410 0.254
ν 0.1550 0.0531 0.0070 0.397 0.1015 0.0312
ω 0.0214 0.0067 0.0009 0.246 0.0317 0.0014
TABLE II. Experimental values of QBERs EWIAIB with inten-
sities IA and IB in basis W ∈ {X,Z}.
rectilinear (Z) basis diagonal (X) basis
HHHHIB
IA µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 0.0178 0.0320 0.167 0.262 0.326 0.465
ν 0.0306 0.0402 0.161 0.322 0.261 0.431
ω 0.156 0.157 0.23 0.469 0.430 0.32
the diagonal basis (|±〉 = 1/√2(|H〉 ± |V 〉)) are rotated
about the H-V axis on the Poincare´ sphere. The voltage
is properly adjusted such that Alice’s diagonal basis is
aligned to Bob’s. The misalignment is around 1% in our
experiment.
All the modulators (PMs, AOMs, and Pol-Ms) are in-
dependently driven by random number generators (func-
tion generators with pre-stored random numbers gener-
ated by a quantum random number generator [31]). An
electrical delay generator (DG) located in Charlie’s setup
synchronizes all the RNGs and the electrical pulse gen-
erators (PGs) driving the IMs.
4In this experiment, it is critical to assure that the weak
coherent pulses independently prepared by Alice and Bob
are indistinguishable at Charlie’s beam splitter in terms
of spectrum and arrival time. The wavelengths of the
lasers used by Alice and Bob are independently locked
to one molecular absorption line of a gas cell (integrated
in the laser by the manufacturer) at around 1542.38 nm.
This guarantees the frequency difference between Alice
and Bob’s lasers is within 10 MHz, while the temporal
width of the pulse is about 1 ns (FWHM), corresponding
to a bandwidth of about 1 GHz. The arrival time of the
pulses can be independently controlled by the DG with a
resolution of 50 ps, and the timing jitter of the electronic
devices is about 100 ps (RMS). Therefore, we can guar-
antee that the two independently prepared pulses have
sufficient overlap in both time and spectrum.
Alice and Bob send their pulses through a 5 km fiber
spool to Charlie , who performs Bell state measurements
on the incoming pulses. Charlie’s measurement setup
consists of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), a polarizing beam
splitter(PBS), and two commercial InGaAs/InP single
photon detectors (SPDs, detection efficiency∼ 10%, dark
count rate ∼ 5 × 10−5). Due to the limited number of
available detectors, we choose to detect photons at the
outputs of one PBS only. A coincidence between the two
detectors (defined as when both SPDs click within 10 ns,
measured by a time-interval analyser, TIA) in this setup,
as discussed above, corresponds to a successful projection
into the triplet state |ψ+〉.
The experiment runs for about 94 hours [32] and a
total number of N = 1.69 × 1011 pulses are sent out.
The gains and QBERs with different intensities in the
rectilinear and diagonal bases can be measured from the
sifted key and the results are listed in Tables I and II,
respectively.
To extract a secure key, Alice and Bob need to estimate
a lower bound of Y Z11 (denoted as Y
Z,L
11 ) and an upper
bound of eX11 (denoted as e
X,U
11 ) from the finite decoy-
state protocol. Here we use an analytical method with
two decoy states for our finite decoy-state analysis. For
an infinitely long key, Y Z,L11 and e
X
11 are given by [28]
Y Z,L11 =
1
(µ− ν)2(ν − ω)2(µ− ν)
× [(µ2 − ω2)(µ− ω)(e2νQZνν + e2ωQZωω − eν+ωQZνω − eω+νQZων)
− (ν2 − ω2)(ν − ω)(e2µQZµµ + e2ωQZωω − eµ+ωQZµω − eω+µQZωµ)],
(2)
eX,U11 =
e2νQXννE
X
νν + e
2ωQXωωE
X
ωω − eν+ωQXνωEXνω − eω+νQXων,UEXων
(ν − ω)2Y X,L11
, (3)
where Y X,L11 in Eq. (3), a lower bound of the gain of single
photon states in the diagonal basis, can be estimated
using Eq. (2), with the superscripts Z replaced by X.
Since the data size in our experiment is finite, statis-
tical fluctuations of the experimental parameters QX,ZIAIB
and EX,ZIAIB need to be taken into account when estimat-
ing Y Z,L11 and e
X,U
11 . We use the method proposed in
[33] and assume a secure bound of =1 × 10−3 (three
standard deviations) [34]. We find Y Z,L11 =4.1× 10−4 and
eX,U11 =15.1%. We can estimate a lower bound of the se-
cure key rate RL = 9.8 × 10−9 using Eq. (1) and the
parameters summarized in Table III. Therefore, a secure
key of length L = 1600 bits can be generated between
Alice and Bob.
Compared to the conventional BB84 QKD protocol,
the key rate of MDI-QKD is lower due to the fact that
this novel protocol relies on coincidence (rather than sin-
gle) detection events to generate key bits. This can be
circumvented by using state-of-the-art superconducting
single photon detectors (SSPDs) with detection efficiency
TABLE III. Parameters used to estimate a lower bound of
the key rate RL.
q p11 Y
Z,L
11 e
X,U
11 Q
Z
µµ E
Z
µµ f
0.011 0.0494 4.1× 10−4 0.151 4.66× 10−5 0.0178 1.16
over 90% [35] at the telecom wavelengths, or alterna-
tively, silicon detectors with 50% detection efficiency at
around 800 nm [36] for free space implementation. Polar-
ization feedback control system [22] can be incorporated
into a MDI-QKD system to further lower the QBERs,
thus reducing the cost in error correction and privacy
amplification. The key generation speed of MDI-QKD
can also be substantially increased if implemented at a
high repetition rate (> 1 GHz), which is feasible with
current technology [37].
In summary, we have demonstrated the first polar-
ization encoding MDI-QKD experiment over 10 km of
optical fibers, with active phase randomization imple-
5mented to defeat attacks on imperfect sources. Our work
shows that, with commercial off-the-shelf optoelectronic
devices, it is feasible to build a QKD system immune
to detector side-channel attack. In particular, the prac-
ticability of polarization encoding MDI-QKD indicates
the potential to build a detector side-channel free QKD
network, in which users only need to possess handy hard-
ware to prepare polarization qubits. Our work can also
be extended to free space polarization encoding MDI-
QKD with an untrusted satellite in the future.
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Appendix A: Polarization alignment in the
experiment
In MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob independently prepare
polarization qubits in their setup. For successful Bell
state measurement, it requires that Alice and Bob have
a shared reference frame of polarization. This is achieved
by applying unitary transformations on their polarization
states using fiber based polarization controllers (PCs)
and an electrical polarization controller (in Alice’s setup
only). Figure 3(a) shows the schematic of the electri-
cal polarization controller, which consists of three fiber
squeezers (driven by piezoelectric actuators) oriented at
0◦, 45◦, 0◦, respectively. Alice and Bob first align their
polarization states in the rectilinear basis (H and V ) to
the polarizing axes of the polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
in Charlie’s setup. This can be done by letting Alice/Bob
send horizontally polarized pulses and adjusting PCs to
minimize photon detection rates (measured by a single
photon detector) at one of the outputs of the PBS. There-
fore they have a shared rectilinear basis as shown in Fig.
3(b), where Alice’s H and V states overlap with those of
Bob’s on the Poincare´ sphere.
Alice’s horizontal polarization state is also aligned to
either the fast or slow axis of the first (from the left)
fiber squeezer in the electrical polarization controller.
A voltage is applied on this squeezer, and the induced
pressure leads to a change in the phase retardation be-
tween the slow and fast axes. This is equivalent to
a unitary transformation U of Alice’s diagonal basis
(|±〉 = 1/√2(|H〉 ± |V 〉)) about the H-V axis on the
Poincare´ sphere, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The volt-
age is adjusted until Alice’s diagonal basis is aligned to
Bob’s. We note that this process does not disturb the
alignment in the rectilinear basis done in previous step.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 3. (Color online). (a)Schematic of the electrical polar-
ization controller. Figure courtesy of General Photonics Corp.
(b)Geometrical representation of the alignment of Alice and
Bob’s reference frames on the Poincare´ sphere.
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